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THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
"BLUEPRINT" FOR REFORMING PRODUCT
LIABILITY TORT LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES*
Duane J. Gingerich**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability' re-
leased its Final Report November 1, 1977. Eighteen months in the
making, this report represented the efforts of a large number of
people in both government and private organizations.! In over 600
pages it describes the causes, nature, and scope of product liability
problems that have arisen in the United States.' Approximately
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views
of the Interagency Task Force.
** B.A., Goshen College, 1969; M.A., University of Hawaii, 1972; J.D., University of Wis-
consin, 1975. Member of Wisconsin Bar; Associate Director of The Research Group, Interna-
tional; Editorial associate for the Interagency Task Force's PRODUCT LIABIuTY: LEGAL STUDY
(1977).
1 The Federal Interagency Task Force was created in April 1976. Agencies participating as
Task Force members were: the Department of Commerce, Council of Economic Advisers,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, Department of Justice, Department of Labor, Department of Transportation, Depart-
ment of Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, and the Small Business Administra-
tion. The Consumer Product Safety Commission provided advice and assistance.
Originally the Task Force was instructed to prepare a report for President Ford's Economic
Policy Board (EPB) on or before December 15, 1976. The Task Force commissioned an
insurance, an industry, and a legal contractor to gather the basic data. The initial report to
the EPB was to indicate the scope and dimension of the problem and to suggest potential
solutions. The Task Force filed a preliminary report on December 15, 1976. The EPB then
issued a modified version of this report on January 4, 1977, entitled the "Interim Briefing
Report."
On the basis of this report, the EPB mandated that the Task Force's contractor studies be
edited and published. This was accomplished between January and April 1977, with the
Interagency Task Force's publication of a seven-volume PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY
(1977), a one-volume PRODUCT LIABILITY: INSURANCE STUDY (1977), and a two-volume PRODUCT
LIABILITY: INDUSTRY STUDY (1977). The INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL
REPORT (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT] is a synthesis of the three contractor
reports as well as other information that came to the Task Force's attention.
I The Task Force had the assistance of an Advisory Committee on Product Liability com-
prised of several dozen individuals representing the gamut of interest groups concerned with
the product liability problem. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at vi.
Among the major findings of the FINAL REPORT:
1. Availability and cost of insurance. Product liability insurance is available for
most firms, but costs have risen very sharply since 1974. The impact has generally
been greater on small, as compared to large, businesses. While the average cost of
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one-third of that space is devoted to an analysis of potential reme-
dies for those problems.'
such insurance is less than one percent of sales in most industries studied by the
Task Force, it is greater-as high as ten percent- for some firms in some industries.
2. Impact on new product development. The cost of product liability insurance
may reinforce trends against new product development so that some socially benefi-
cial products may never be developed or may be discontinued.
3. Business failures. Product liability problems do not appear to have been a
direct and sole cause of a large number of business failures, according to the FINAL
REPORT.
4. Product liability claims. The report estimates that from between 60,000 to
70,000 product liability claims were filed in 1976. It indicates that there was abso-
lutely no basis for estimates that appeared in some trade industry press stating that
one million claims were filed in that year.
5. Product liability loss prevention. Many manufacturers of high-risk products are
devoting more time and money to product liability loss prevention because of in-
creased insurance costs and the tort-litigation system.
The most frequent criticism leveled at the Task Force is that its FINAL REPORT did not
make specific legislative recommendations to Congress or to the Administration. The official
explanation given by Undersecretary of Commerce Sidney Harman at a news conference
coinciding with the release of the FINAL REPORT was that this was not the Task Force's
mandate. According to Harman, consistent with instructions from the EPB, the FINAL REPORT
was to stop short of recommending specific legislation. Nevertheless, upon his confirmation
as Undersecretary in March 1977, Harman apparently requested the Task Force staff to reach
"conclusions," no doubt anticipating a storm of criticism if the FINAL REPORT did little in the
way of suggesting solutions to the problems it found.
In a somewhat unusual move, the Department of Commerce on April 6, 1978, released an
"Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Issues" for public com-
ment. See 43 Fed. Reg. 14612 (1978). This "Options Paper" had been sent to the White House
on February 24, 1978, with suggestions on how the Administration might respond to the
product liability issue. As this Article goes to press, the Carter Administration has yet to
indicate what it proposes to do about the product liability problem.
However, the Department of Commerce's "Options Paper," may offer some clues. Briefly,
it recommends two short-term and nine long-term solutions. The short-term recommenda-
tions are:
(1) The Internal Revenue Code should be amended to permit qualified busi-
nesses to set aside a portion of their pre-tax income to fund a specific reserve for
self-insurance against product liability claims and related costs.
(2) The Department recommends that the Administration not pursue either a
federal insurance or a reinsurance program relating to product liability.
As for long-term solutions, the "Options Paper" advances these recommendations:
(1) Prepare a report that would include draft product liability insurance regula-
tion standards. The report should indicate whether and to what extent direct fed-
eral regulation of product liability insurance is warranted.
(2) Draft a model product liability law that could be implemented at the federal
level or utilized by the states.
(3) Draft legislation for federal standards in the area of Worker Compensation
should include a provision that would render Worker Compensation a sole source
of monetary recovery for workers injured in product-related accidents.
(4) A study should be conducted to determine whether a practical no-fault prod-
uct liability system can be developed, in whole or in part, for consumer products.
1978] INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE "BLUEPRINT"
The Final Report identified three principal causes of the recent
dramatic rise in product liability insurance premiums: insurance
ratemaking procedures, the tort-litigation system, and unsafe man-
ufacturing practices.' The Task Force was unable to say whether one
cause was more important than another, but noted the tendency for
each group with a special interest in the product liability problem
to claim that the "cause" was attributable to the conduct of some
other group.'
Perhaps the most comprehensive research document currently
available on the product liability situation in the United States, the
Final Report lends itself to analysis from many directions. For ex-
ample, it tackles the controversial role that product liability insur-
ers have played in the so-called product liability "crisis." 7 It also
analyzes the potential of product liability prevention techniques.8
Nevertheless, the present inquiry is more limited. Having isolated
the tort litigation system as one of the three principal "causes" of
the product liability problem, the question is what the Task Force
offered in the way of remedies to perceived problems in that sys-
tem.' The Final Report has been touted by its authors as a "source
(5) A program should be developed whereby the federal government more effec-
tively distributes product risk information to manufacturers, distributors, and re-
tailers.
(6) A special loan program that would permit qualified small businesses to obtain
product liability loss prevention technical assistance.
(7) Legislation should be drafted that would permit the formation of captive
insurance companies in the area of product liability.
(8) Administrative or legislative guidelines should be developed that would
assist private insurers in the formation of voluntary insurance pools. Legislation
that would require insurers to pool product liability insurer risks should not be
developed at this time.
(9) The Administraton should establish an Interagency Council on Accident Com-
pensation. The Council would have the initial responsibility for reviewing and
coordinating federal initiatives in the area of accident compensation.
FINAL REPORT supra note 1, at 1-20-31. Among the "other causes" which the Task Force
isolated but did not consider to be as significant as these three were inflation, consumer and
worker awareness, increases in the number and complexity of products, and product misuse.
I Id. at 1-21. "It is our view that the product liability problem is based on a confluence of
causes and that it will be resolved only if each cause is properly addressed."
' Id. ch. V, "Product Liability Insurance," at V-1-50. In both its interim briefing report
and its final report, the Task Force refused to declare the present product liability situation
a "crisis." It recognized, however, that "product liability problems present a potential disrup;
tive effect on the economy. More importantly, the problem is not amenable to simple reme-
dies. It is a subtle problem in which the interests of consumers, workers, manufacturers,
distributors, retailers and insurers have to be balanced." Id. at 1-2.
' Id. ch. IV, "Product Liability Prevention Techniques," at IV-1-13.
' "We have concluded that this cause of the product liability problem can only be ad-
dressed by a careful review of product liability as a whole." Id. at 1-28.
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document" capable of leading "policymakers and other interested
parties toward constructive solutions for problems that have arisen
in the area of product liability."'" What, if any, "blueprint" for tort
reform does the Task Force offer?
The answer to this question is not as readily apparent as one
might expect. Frequently, so called "conclusions" of the Final
Report are less than illuminating. In fact, the lines of the "blue-
print" (if one can call it that) are anything but crisp and clear on
many details." To reach that conclusion, however, it is necessary
to follow the Task Force through its analysis of remedial approaches
to tort law reform. That involves, first, proposals to modify some
basic product liability rules; secondly, proposals to modify a num-
ber of basic product liability rules relating to damages; thirdly,
remedial approaches to product liability rules relating to workplace
injuries; and finally, two alternatives to the present tort litigation
system of compensating consumer product injuries-no-fault and
arbitration.
II. BACKGROUND TO STATUTORY TORT REFORM
A. Intrinsic Problems
Few would argue with the statement that the product liability
problem is terribly complex. Nor would many argue that solutions
are likely to appear out of the blue as if by magic. The problem has
been analogized to the fable of the blind men and the elephant.
Some, quite plausibly, will perceive the product liability "elephant"
as solely a legal problem. Some will see it as an insurance problem.
Still others might see the problem strictly as an engineering or a
manufacturing problem. In short, product liability is viewed as
whatever kind of problem a person's blinders permit him or her to
11 Statement of Undersecretary of Commerce Sidney Harman on the FINAL REPORT of the
Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability before the Senate Select Committee on
Small Business (Nov. 22, 1977).
1 This is intended more by way of comment than criticism. For example, although describ-
ing its study as the "most thorough" on the topic ever published in the United States, the
Task Force acknowledged that "it does not purport to answer all questions" relating to the
problem. Again, while reaching "some important conclusions," the Task Force conceded that
"firm conclusions" about the product liability problems are difficult to reach. Considering
the disparate consumer, insurer and business group interests that it was seeking to balance,
this imprecision is perhaps understandable.
12 Chapter VII of the FINAL REPORT focuses on both tort and insurance remedies. Part V of
Chapter VII discusses "Proposed Modifications of Product Liability Insurance Mechanisms."
This Article does not include that topic, but concentrates solely on the tort litigation remedial
proposals discussed in the FINAL REPORT.
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see." The difficulty arises, of course, in the realization that the
product liability problem is each and all of these things at the same
time. This feature renders the single magical solution, just that-so
much magic.
Approaches to product liability solutions suffer from the same
limited perception. Some think that legislation is the only answer.
Others suggest that the answer should be found in the continued
development of the common law. Still others believe that the solu-
tion lies in designing safer products. Under these Babel-like circum-
stances, perhaps the only thing one can say with confidence is that
there is no single solution that will satisfy everyone.
The Task Force apparently opted for a legislative approach to tort
law reform. This seems implicit in the following statement:
There has been over 10 years of intense litigation in the area of
product liability, since the publication of Restatement of Torts
Section 402A. There are sufficient resources to allow a legislature
to make a rational decision in regard to those issues. It would seem
that the product liability insurance problem might be on its way
toward resolution if legislatures, in the immediate future, took
action on those matters."
At another point, the Task Force seemed to despair of solutions
coming from the continued development of the common law. It
noted that the "uncertainty" which it found underlying much of the
problem in product liability law "springs from the nature of the
common law itself."' 5 In fairness, however, if the Task Force is to
be criticized for selecting the legislative vehicle to tort-litigation
reform, it is less for taking that position than for failing to articulate
a full appreciation of the complexities of statutory tort reform.
There are problems. The legislative reformer, like a skilled sur-
geon, must know how deep to cut if the operation is to be successful.
Cutting too deeply into the structure of the tort system may upset
established relationships between the tort law and other areas of the
law. There is always the danger of legal overkill-a danger of re-
moving sound parts of the system with the unsound. On the other
" See MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A MAPI SURVEY 3
(1976).
, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-19.
" Id. at VII-15.
, Epstein, Products Liability: The Art of Statutory Reform, in PROCEEDINGS, MAAC II
PRODUCT LIABIUTY SOLUTIONS CONFERENCE, 52 (May 16-17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as MAAC
n1 PROC.I.
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hand, trying to correct imbalances in the system by wielding the
knife too lightly may result in new statutes or rules which the parties
may evade simply by changing the way they construct their plead-
ings or argue their cases. 7
As if this is not difficult enough, historical developments throw
another monkey wrench into the works. Should product liability tort
reforms be adopted at the state or federal level? 8 The question is
not an easy one. Unfortunately, the Task Force sidestepped the
issue, leaving it to the "policymakers."' 9 If and when they decide to
move forward with tort reform, these same policymakers may dis-
cover to their consternation that the venue of such reforms may be
as important to the overall product liability solution as the proposed
reforms themselves.
B. The Task Force Guidelines
The preceeding discussion merely adds to the wisdom of reversing
a well-known maxim in the product liability context to say that "for
every solution, there is a problem.""° Essential to reform, of course,
is a point of reference from which to measure what the state of
affairs in product liability law ought to be. To its credit, the Task
Force set out six guiding principles for evaluating potential modifi-
cations in product liability law:
1. Ensure that a person injured by an unreasonably unsafe prod-
uct receives reasonable compensation for his or her injury.
2. Ensure the availability of affordable product liability insur-
ance with adequate coverage to manufacturers that engage in rea-
sonably safe design and quality control practices.
3. Place the incentive for risk prevention on the party or parties
who are best able to accomplish that goal.
4. Expedite the reparation process from the time of injury to the
time the claim is paid.
5. Minimize the sum of accident costs, prevention costs and
transaction costs.
6. Make the remedy specific and concrete in nature and format."'
" Id. at 53.
" See The Research Group International, Federal or State-Level Tort Reform?, 1 PRODUCT
LIABILITY TRENDS 49 (1977).
11 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xliv.
10 LaFalce, Product Liability: Where Do We Go From Here, in MAAC II PROC., supra note
16, at 9.
2, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-2-8.
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Viewed objectively, these principles seem unassailable. However,
the likelihood of achieving all of these objectives in any given reme-
dial package is probably slim. Nevertheless, without such guide-
lines, however general and unrefined, there is a greater likelihood
that the cure will end up worse than the disease. Having raised these
concerns about the inherent difficulties in statutory tort reform, it
remains to determine how well the Task Force approached the wide
variety of remedial tort reform proposals.
III. MODIFYING BASIC PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES
A. Introduction
Most of the remedial proposals aired by the TaskForce assume
the continued existence of the present tort litigation system in
which liability is determined on a case-by-case basis. Proposals
have been offered to scrap the system in the product liability con-
text, but so far there have been few takers.22 Furthermore, the legal
contractor for the Task Force concluded that the existing tort sys-
tem was basically sound and that any modification attempted
should be in the nature of "refinements" rather than a "major over-
haul."23
Underlying this conclusion was a complementary perception that
even drastic changes in the present law would not likely have an
immediate impact on the availability or affordability of product
liability insurance. This is a theme repeated frequently in the Task
Force's analysis of how certain basic product liability rules might
be modified.
B. Basic Standard of Responsibility
According to the Task Force, a major culprit in the current prod-
uct liability problem is the "lack of predictability" in basic product
liability rules.24 The Task Force argued that insurers suffer
"tremendous uncertainty" about what their insured's basic respon-
' The notable exception is New Zealand where a no-fault compensation plan has been in
operation since April 1, 1974. Managed by a government-operated independent agency, the
Accident Compensation System, the scheme eliminated the right of accident victims to
proceed in tort against the manufacturer. See Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zea-
land: The First Two Years, 25 AM. J. COMp. L. 1 (1977); Harris, Accident Conpensation in
New Zealand: A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD. L. REv. 361 (1974).
z' Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, I PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY 19 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as PRODUCT LIABIuT: LEGAL STUDY].
1, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-15.
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sibilities are and, therefore, presumably err on the side of extreme
caution when setting their premium rates."
Whether insurers are in fact as incapacitated by these uncertain-
ties as the Task Force claims is not immediately clear from any data
presented. Rather, the Task Force's conclusion seems to be a com-
mon sense perception of how intelligent people might react to the
admittedly confusing sets of standards that courts in 50 states im-
pose on a manufacturer's conduct.
In any event, the Task Force seemed to trace this lack of predicta-
bility in basic product liability rules to the nature of the common
law itself, developing as it has on a case-by-case basis.2" More specif-
ically, however, the Task Force focused on section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts and the uneven perception of its
strict liability principle among the states. 27 For example, some
states require a defective condition to be "unreasonably danger-
ous,"28 while others merely require that the product be "defective. 21 9
Two areas, particularly, are singled out as having caused courts
extreme difficulty in formulating standards for product manufac-
turers: design defect and failure to warn of unsafe conditions. Courts
have compounded confusion in these types of cases by reaching
results under strict liability theories that would have been no differ-
ent under negligence theories.30
25 Id. at VII-18.
Id. at VII-15.
2 402A, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 347 (1965). See Orban, Product Liability: A
Comparative Legal Restatement-Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 342, 383 (1978) for the text of § 402A. See also, Green, Strict Liability Under
Section 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185 (1976). Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973).
21 E.g., Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970);
Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
29 The State of California is the leading jurisdiction which holds that the product need not
be "unreasonably dangerous" in order for the plaintiff to recover, merely "defective." Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972). See also, Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co., 6 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. (BNA) 95 (1978).
2, As Dean Wade has stated:
In the case of the improper design which makes the product dangerous, whatever
is enough to show that it is so dangerous that strict liability should apply . ..
will also be enough to show negligence on the part of the manufacturer. Even if the
manufacturer is not aware of the danger created by the bad design, he is negligent
in not learning of it. This is also true if the product is unsafe because it did not
carry a suitable warning or adequate instruction. The proof necessary to establish
strict liability will certainly be sufficient to establish negligence liability as well.
There are thus innate similarities between the actions in negligence and in strict
[Vol. 8:279
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What does the Task Force propose to do about this perceived
crisis of uncertainty over the standard of responsibility? Without
stating so clearly, the Task Force appeared to support the sugges-
tion of its legal contractor that one cause of action be developed for
product liability cases. The legal contractor's conclusion was that
courts, despite lip service to strict liability, have not abandoned
negligence and fault concepts in design defect and duty-to-warn
cases, and that to recognize this reality would help to reduce some
of the present confusion.'
The Task Force agreed with the concept of a single cause of action
for products cases. 2 Under such a concept, manufacturers should be
held strictly liable in manufacturing defect cases. On the other
hand, in design defect or failure to warn cases, the Task Force
concludes that foreseeability and seriousness of harm should be bal-
anced against the utility of the product and the burden on the
manufacturer to avoid the risk. In the latter situations the Task
Force concluded that strict liability under the tort system did not
appear to be sound long-range policy.
C. Statutes of Limitations or Repose
Beyond the uncertainties in the tort law surrounding the standard
of responsibility are others equally deserving of attention. Product
manufacturers, especially manufacturers of durable goods, have
had less than clear guidance from the courts as to their continuing
duty with respect to older products.34 Citing its insurance contractor
study, the Task Force suggested that there seems to be a correlation
between the insurance underwriter's concern about the potential for
losses involving older products and the increase in liability prem-
iums for manufacturers of durable goods. At the same time, the
Task Force noted that it had information which suggested that any
"reform" in this area as in others, would not automatically result
in lower premiums.35
Statutes of limitation or repose and a useful life limitation are the
liability, and changing the terminology does not alter this.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 836-37 (1973).
, See IV PRODUCT LIABIuTY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 94-96.
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-19.
Id. at VII-19-20.
E.g., Tucker v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 256 Or. 318, 320, 473 P.2d 862 (1970) (" .
prolonged use of a manufactured article is but one factor, albeit an important one, in the
determination of whether a defect in the product made it unsafe .... .
11 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1 at VII-21.
19781
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
reforms considered. Some states already have statutes of limitations
for product liability actions, beginning at the time of initial sale or
manufacture." The Task Force concedes that there is some merit to
the argument that a statute of limitations in product cases based
on time of injury may be "unfair" to capital equipment manufactur-
ers since they sell relatively few products and may not be able to
pass-on their product liability costs in higher prices. Nevertheless,
the Task Force was troubled that under a statute of repose, some
victims of injury from an old defective product will be prevented
from suing to collect damages.37
How does the Task Force resolve this tension between a manufac-
turer's need to cut off stale claims and an individual's right to be
compensated for injury caused by defective products? First, it ad-
vances, then discards as administratively unworkable, a suggestion
to limit a manufacturer's duty to the "ordinary useful life of that
product." The Task Force found two major difficulties with this
approach: the difficulty of deciding who should set the standard for
a given product's "useful life" and the difficulty of actually defining
such a period for all or most products.38
Secondly, the Task Force offered a number of "suggestions" to
guide a statutory change to existing statutes of limitation. At the
heart of these suggestions is a recommendation to distinguish work-
place and non-workplace (or consumer) product injuries. The Task
Force concluded that it "would seem reasonable" to give the manu-
facturer of workplace goods a ten-year statute of repose.39 At the
same time, however, the employer should remain responsible for an
" E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-13 (1977); ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.115(1) (Cumm. Supp.
1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (1977). The legislatures of Indiana (H.B. 1396),
Georgia (S.B. 513) and Minnesota (H.F. 338) have also passed statute of limitations bills in
1978, effective in mid-1978. For a discussion of Georgia's statute, see Sentell, Strict Products
Tort Liability in Georgia: Smudging a Clean Slate, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (1978).
:,7 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1 at VII-25.
Id. at VII-28.
' Id. The Task Force makes a special point of limiting this recommendation to a manufac-
turer's responsibility under tort law. The Supreme Court of Oregon has upheld the applica-
tion of that state's ten-year statute to a product-related injury:
A cause of action may be constitutionally abolished or limited so long as it is not
done arbitrarily and there is a legitimate, countervailing public interest or policy
which arguably is served by such action. There are legitimate public policies which
are served by the enactment of a statute of ultimate repose, which policies have
heretofore been identified.
Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 530 P.2d 53 (Ore. 1974) (strict liability claim against manu-
facturer of an allegedly defective sander purchased in 1959 barred by statute because the
injury did not occur until 1970).
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injured worker's out-of-pocket expenses if the employer has sub-
jected a worker to an unsafe machine. If, on the other hand, the
accident was the result of a defect present in the machine when it
was sold, the employer should have an opportunity in an arbitration
proceeding to place the cost of the accident on the manufacturer.40
For consumer product injuries, the Task Force favored a slightly
different approach. The same ten-year from time of sale limitation
would apply, with the restriction that for injuries caused by defects
in a product when sold, but not manifested until after ten years, the
manufacturer would still be subject to liability for the injured per-
son's "actual economic losses." An arbitration proceeding (not a
trial) would be the vehicle to handle such cases.'
As with any compromise solution, neither the product manufac-
turer nor the product consumer will find the Task Force's solution
totally satisfactory. Considering the fact that in most states the
appropriate statute of limitations still runs from the time of injury,
the victim of a product-related injury sustained ten years after the
sale of a product has the most to lose under the Task Force sugges-
tion. In view of data indicating that only four percent of bodily
injury claims still have not occurred eight years after the date of
manufacture of the product,42 it may be appropriate to question
whether the manufacturer's need to cut off stale claims has not been
given undue attention.
D. The Unavoidably Unsafe Product
The Task Force notes that despite rather specific language in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts43 which exempts manufacturers of
"unavoidably unsafe" products from liability, the legal status of
such products remains clouded. Citing the Swine Flu experience,
the Task Force commented that an "unavoidably unsafe duty limi-
tation" embodied in legislation "would reduce the uncertainty that
has led to the substantial rise in product liability insurance prem-
iums."" The Task Force was quick to point out, however, that such
legislation would not necessarily mean that insurance would sud-
denly become more available or affordable.
4 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-28.
" Id. at VII-29.
, INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABuTY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY (HIGHLIGHTS) 4
(1977). [hereinafter cited as ISO SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS].
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment k (1965).
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-31.
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The Task Force was "convinced" that the section 402A exception
should remain in the law for the present. For the long-term, how-
ever, the Task Force favored a no-fault system for pharmaceuticals
and other potentially unavoidably unsafe products. 5
E. Developing Predictable Legal Standards
1. State of the Art Defense
Product manufacturers would like to see a statutory defense to
liability which would bar recovery when a product conformed to the
industry norm at the time the product was sold. 6 They complain
that in judging whether their products are unreasonably dangerous
and thus "defective" at the time of sale courts view their products
in light of current technology and knowledge. 7 Courts generally
admit evidence of industry custom with respect to a product, but
follow the time-honored view of Judge Learned Hand that such
evidence should not be a final determinant of the issue of proper
design, since an entire industry may be remiss in its designs."
Before stating its own view on a state of the art defense, 9 the Task
Force outlined the several alternatives available. One would be to
create a presumption that a product was not unreasonably unsafe
if the defendant could show that the alleged defect in its product
comported with industry custom. Another approach would be to
legislate product standards. A third approach would be to require
the court to instruct the jury to focus on the technology and knowl-
edge of product risks known at the time the product was manufac-
tured.-"
Id. at VII-32.
J NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WHOLESALERS-DISTRIBUTORS, PRODUCT LIABILITY PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO STATE STATUTES 7 (undated) [hereinafter cited as NAW PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS].
'" The term "state of the art" has proved to be confusing to the courts. Some courts have
equated the term with common industry customs. See, e.g., Lunt v. Brady Manufacturing
Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970). Others have taken a broader engineering
definition and have considered state of the art to be the highest standards economically and
technically feasible-not simply industry custom. See, e.g., Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,
11 Cal.App.3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 328 (1970).
' The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
A difficulty in discussing a state of the art "defense" is that it takes three possible forms:
(1) what some designers of similar products were doing at the time of product design, (2) what
some designers of similar products theoretically could have done at that time, and (3) what
designers of similar products were doing generally at that time in the exercise of "practical
skill in performance." Raleigh, The 'State of the Art' in Product Liability: A New Look at
an Old Defense, 4 OHIO NORTH. L. REV. 249, 253 (1977).
m FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-35-36.
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It would be "inadvisable," the Task Force concluded, to legislate
a state of the art defense based on industry custom.5 Such a defense
would undermine the principle of placing the incentive for risk pre-
vention on the party best able to accomplish that goal. The Task
Force offered a suggestion for handling design defect cases, however,
by commenting that liability perhaps should result only if the prod-
uct failed to conform to a "practical and reasonable" state of the
art standard viewed from the perspective of the time of manufac-
ture. Factors to consider in such cases would be the technology
available, the cost and practicality of alternative design choices,
and the industry custom."
As for the presumption of the no-defect approach, the Task Force
supported such a remedial step in the case of particular products
which had product standards developed by neutral and reliable
sources. At the same time, the Task Force recognized that it might
cost too much to develop such standards for all products.53
2. Compliance with Safety Standards Defense
Having disposed of arguments for an "industry custom" state of
the art defense, the Task Force proceeded to test the arguments for
and against liability of a manufacturer when the product in question
complied with relevant legislative or administrative standards. The
Task Force conceded that the latter defense had stronger arguments
in its favor than a state of the art defense.54
For a variety of reasons, courts in the United States have never
given their blessing to an absolute compliance with safety standards
defense.5 First, such standards are suspected of being little more
than a rubber-stamped version of existing industry standards. Sec-
ondly, such standards cannot possibly be comprehensive enough.
Thirdly, such standards become out-dated quickly."t The key con-
cern of the Task Force was whether a complete standards compli-
ance defense might not have an unfortunate impact on risk preven-
1, Id. The fact that a particular product meets or exceeds requirements of its industry is
not conclusive proof that the product is reasonably safe. Gilbert v. Stone City Construction
Co., Inc., 357 N.E.2d 738 (Ind. 1977).
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-37. An Arizona court has recently held that a manu-
facturer is not held to a duty to produce a machine which incorporates only the ultimate in
safety features. Rodriguez v. Besser Co., 115 Ariz. 454, 565 P.2d 1315 (1977).
'a FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VI1-37.
Id. at VII-42.
See IV PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 132.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1 at VII-38.
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tion incentives in that it would "permit manufacturers to sit back
and rely on out-of-date government standards ..
The Task Force saw little merit in treating compliance with fed-
eral regulations differently from compliance with state standards,
even though federal regulations arguably may be stricter."8 Both sets
of standards have problems related to quality and timeliness, the
Task Force concluded.
Reading between the lines, however, there is language in the Final
Report which would hold the door open for a possible discretionary
use of a compliance defense. The Task Force cites with at least
backhanded approval the new Utah product liability law which
applies a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness in cases where
the alleged defect was in conformity with government standards. 9
The Task Force concluded that where a court was satisfied with the
quality and timeliness of a particular product standard, "it might
be inappropriate" to allow a jury to require more of the defendantA'
F. Regulation of Expert Testimony
The failure of some courts to regulate expert witness testimony is
cited by manufacturers as causing uncertainty in determining
whether their products will subject them to tort liability." After
acknowledging that there is indeed a problem of the "biased expert"
in the tort litigation system, the Task Force identified two ap-
proaches to curb that tendency: (1) courts make wider use of court-
appointed experts under a procedure modeled on Federal Rule of
Evidence section 706, and (2) courts in major product liability cases
hold preliminary hearings to test the qualifications of experts.2
., Id. at VII-40.
-v Id. at VII-42. Section 2074(a) of the Consumer Product Safety Act expressly rejects a
federal compliance defense: "Compliance with consumer product safety rules ... shall not
relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any other
person." 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1976).
"' UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1977) (rebuttable presumption of no defect in all cases
where the alleged defect conformed with government standards).
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-40.
Apparently there are expert witnesses for hire, who for a fee will alter credentials and
testimony to suit a particular case. See Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein,
Technological Expert in Product Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1312 (1974).
11 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-46. Professor Weinstein and three colleagues have
proposed a three-step analysis for testing such qualifications:
Initially, the court must be satisfied that the pervasive discipline, as identified by
a given issue, is within the scope of the witness's background skills. Then the
prospective witness must persuade the court that the self-education that he has
undertaken involved a legitimate application of his basic skills. Finally, the witness
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The Task Force concluded that it did not know whether either or
both of these alternatives would improve results, but it doubted that
the use of these methods would make the situation worse. Further-
more, the Task Force suggested that an arbitration procedure with
an expert sitting as one of the triers of fact could be even more
effective.3
G. Product Misuse
Product manufacturers have long complained about what they
consider the unfairness of shouldering the entire responsibility for a
product injury when in fact the product user (or an employee) was
responsible to some degree for the injury. 4 American courts have not
spoken with a clear voice on this subject. Some appear to limit a
manufacturer's responsibility to producing a product that is safe in
its ordinary, intended use. 5 Others have held that a manufacturer
must anticipate foreseeable misuses and warn against them.66 Most,
however, agree that a manufacturer's duty stops short of warning
about unforeseeable misuses. 7
The Task Force discussed, then dismissed as impractical, a possi-
ble solution to product misuse which would have a neutral source
predetermine what is or is not a foreseeable misuse of a product for
tort law purposes." In the workplace injury context the Task Force
criticized the new Utah approach which shields the manufacturer
from liability when "a substantive contributing cause of the injury
was an alteration or modification of the product." 9 The manufac-
turer ought to bear some responsiblity for warning about a hazard,
the Task Force argued, in cases where it was reasonably foreseeable
that an employer or employee might alter the product so as to make
must demonstrate that he has been sufficiently thorough in acquiring this self-
education to achieve a level of qualification consistent with the technical issues that
he will address.
Weinstein, Products Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv.
425, 432 (1974).
3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-46.
" Hearings on Product Liability Insurance Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment
and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, 252-60 (1977) (statement of William C. McCamant).
65 E.g., McCaleb v. Mackey Paint Mfg. Co., Inc., 343 So. 2d 511 (Ala. 1977).
" E.g., Barnes v. Litton Industrial Products, Inc., 555 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1977).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 402A, Comment h (1965); see also Dale & Hilton,
Use of the Product-When Is It Abnormal?, 4 WILLIAMETrE L.J. 350 (1967).
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-48-54.
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-5 (1977).
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it dangerous. 0
The remedial proposal which the Task Force seemed to favor was
the adoption of a comparative responsibility system. In the typical
foreseeable misuse consumer product case, this system would result
in a plaintiff having his or her damages reduced by the correspond-
ing amount of responsibility for the injury.7 Such a system might
also be applied to cases in which third parties have misused the
product, for example, employers in the workplace injury situation.
The Task Force expressed some concern that this system might
raise employer's insurance costs and disrupt the workers' compensa-
tion system. It went on to state, however, that an additional advan-
tage of a comparative fault or responsibility system would be to
eliminate the troublesome distinctions between contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk that have been giving courts concep-
tual headaches.72
Having said that, it is not easy to determine exactly where the
Task Force comes to rest in its analysis of a comparative responsibil-
ity system. Depending upon one's predilections, there is grist for
every mill in its discussion. Bending backwards to be fair, the Task
Force in this instance left the issues in equipoise, perhaps no closer
to resolution than before. This equivocal position is the more sur-
prising since a growing majority of states have already adopted some
form of comparative negligence. Some courts have even taken the
lead and applied comparative fault principles in the context of strict
liability.73
10 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-50.
11 There are three basic types of comparative negligence currently in use. Under a "pure"
comparative system, the plaintiff's recovery is simply reduced by the degree of contributory
fault. wsee, e.g., Fontaine v. Devonis, 336 A.2d 847 (R.I. 1975).
"Fifty percent" jurisdictions employ a form of comparative negligence which allows the
negligent plaintiff to recover a percentage of his or her damages only when the plaintiff's
negligence does not equal or exceed that of the defendant. E.g., Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d
101 (N.D. 1974).
The third type of comparative negligence allows the apportionment of damages when the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is "slight" in comparison with the negligence of the
defendant. E.g., Morrison v. Scotts Bluff County, 104 Neb. 254, 177 N.W. 158 (1920).
For a current listing of states with comparative negligence statutes and principal cases, see
The Research Group International, 2 PRODUCT LAaILITY TRENDS, 83-84 (1978).
72 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-54-55. The Florida Supreme Court recently removed
assumption of risk as an absolute defense from under its comparative negligence system.
Assumption of risk was merged with the defense of contributory negligence and now operates
in Florida merely to reduce plaintiff's damages and not as a complete bar. Blackburn v.
Dorta, 350 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1977).
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IV. MODIFYING PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES ON DAMAGES
A. Introduction
The Task Force's claims that "one of the most efficient ways to
'reform' product liability law" would be to modify the rules on dam-
ages.74 That proposition seems to rest on the fact of life in product
liability litigation that ultimately everyone comes around to dis-
cussing damages. The Task Force did not analyze every conceivable
modification of the law of damages, but concentrated instead on five
key areas: attorney's fees, awards for pain and suffering, the collat-
eral source rule, punitive damages, and use of periodic payments.
Overall, the thrust of the Task Force's analysis is toward modifica-
tion rather than abrupt departure from existing rules.
B. Attorney's Fees
Probably as controversial as any single item on the reform
agenda, proposals to change the present contingent fee system in
any drastic way have not met with much success.75 A few states now
regulate contingent fees in product liability cases using a sliding
scale approach of reduced fees for increasing amounts of recovery. "
Quite correctly, the Task Force begins its analysis by noting that
defense attorney fees also figure significantly in the cost of product
liability insurance. Indeed, the final Insurance Services Office (ISO)
Survey shows that for every dollar of loss actually paid to an injured
plaintiff, insurers incur defense costs of an additional 35 cents for
bodily injury and 48 cents for property damage cases, regardless of
who wins. The ISO study estimates defense attorney's fees to ac-
count for 83 percent of defense costs.77
Nevertheless, plaintiff's contingent fees have been the subject of
most of the unfavorable publicity and the calls for reform. " In the
11 See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 6 PRODucr SAFETY & LIAIuTY REP. (BNA) 250
(1978). Busch v. Busch Construction Inc., 5 PRODUCT SArTY & LIABIUTY REP. (BNA) 942
(1977); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kinard v. Coats Co., 553
P.2d 835 (Colo. App. 1976). But cf., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla.
1974).
7, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-56.
' The Florida Supreme Court recently rejected a Florida Bar Association proposal to
impose limits on the size of contingent fees, while approving rules on division of fees and fee
disclosure. In re Florida Bar, Re Amendment to Code of Professional Responsibility (Contin-
gent Fees), No. 48-384 (Fla., filed July 14, 1977), 20 ATLA L. Rptr. 350 (1977).
E.g., Michigan General Court Rule 928 (May 2, 1975). See V PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL
STUDY, note 23 supra, at 84-85.
7 ISO SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 42, at 3.
, NAW PROPOSED AMENDMENTS supra note 46, at 12-13.
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Task Force's view, however, there is no assurance that product lia-
bility premiums would go down even if the contingent fees were
eliminated, much less modified. The Task Force did find some un-
desirable aspects to the contingent fee, in that it can create a con-
flict of interest in settlement situations and create a situation in
which the winner indirectly pays the legal costs of those with unsuc-
cessful claims. The contingent fee may tempt some attorneys to
bring frivolous suits, the Task Force added, but in its view the better
response to this problem was to punish the few individuals who
abused the system rather than abolish it entirely.79
On balance, the Task Force favored retaining the contingent fee
system in some fashion. Implicit in the Task Force's analysis is a
concern that drastic change would not be appropriate as long as
either federal or state governments did not appear willing to step in
for those persons who would not be able to afford legal services if
the contingent fee disappeared. The Task Force stated that the
sliding scale contingent fee system "makes sense" although it may
work unfairly under certain circumstances."0 It rejected as impracti-
cal a related proposal to eliminate damages for pain and suffering
and allow a court to award the attorney's fee.8"
C. Pain and Suffering
In personal injury action awards for pain and suffering often ex-
ceed the aggregate award for all out-of-pocket losses."2 A 1972 study
estimated, in fact, that for every dollar awarded for out-of-pocket
loss, $1.50 was awarded for pain and suffering. 3 There is considera-
ble debate, however, whether such a drastic step as eliminating
damages for pain and suffering would actually reduce the size of
jury awards. While the Task Force found only that "value judg-
ments" abound in this area, it did venture the judgment that pro-
posals to eliminate pain and suffering damages are "more likely" to
' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-58-63.
Id. at VII-63.
51 Id. at VII-61-62.
82 See V PRODUCT LuI~arYN: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 96.
J. O'CONNELL & S. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING, appendix V (1972), at 10.
Professor O'Connell since has taken the position that this estimate is too low, stating that
"very often an arbitrary rule of thumb is adopted which pays a multiple of, say,
two or three, or even seven or ten, times the medical bills to compensate for pain
and suffering."
J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 51
(1975).
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have a long-range (presumably as opposed to short-range) effect on
insurance premiums."
Essentially, the Task Force concluded that proposals to limit
rather than eliminate pain and suffering awards had the most merit.
It considered three approaches to limit such awards:"' limiting the
award to a specific multiple of special damages, setting a ceiling on
awards, and limiting awards based on the type of injury suffered.
The Task Force found the first unsatisfactory, in part because of the
potential for malingering. The second it found objectionable as un-
fair to those most severely injured. The third approach found most
favor, although not without some concern about the arbitrariness
and potential for prolonging litigation. Here again, however, the
Task Force's somewhat opaque conclusion implies that whatever
reform occurs in this area, the impact on premiums would likely be
in the long-term stabilization of insurance rates rather than their
short-term reduction. 6
D. Modifying the Collateral Source Rule
The "collateral source rule" is a widely accepted principle of tort
law which permits an injured party to recover benefits from as many
sources as he has had the foresight to marshall in advance, in addi-
tion to recovering from the tortfeasor. In practice, the collateral
source rule operates as an evidentiary rule, excluding defense evi-
dence offered to show that the injured plaintiff had already re-
covered partial or full compensation for his or her loss. 7 Proponents
of reform in this area argue that the rule is economically wasteful
to the extent that it allows double recovery for damages, as for
example, in cases where health or accident insurance already covers
the injury. The Task Force pointed out, correctly, that the collateral
source rule does not always result in double recovery, since a typical
''collateral source" such as a Worker Compensation carrier may be
subrogated to a plaintiff's claim against the defendant."
The Task Force weighed the numerous pros and cons of retaining
the collateral source rule, finding little to recommend its complete
abolition, except in strict liability cases. In the latter case, the Task
Force concluded that a modification seeking to eliminate double
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-69.
" Id. at VII-68-69.
m Id. at VII-69.
'7 See V PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 136.
' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-70.
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recovery would be "both theoretically and practically consistent"
with risk distribution theory."
The Task Force also appeared willing to accept a modified collat-
eral source rule modeled on medical malpractice statutes in several
states which provide for reduced damages where the plaintiff has
been reimbursed by public collateral sources. 0
On balance, however, the Task Force raised more issues than it
answered with respect to this proposed remedy. There is nothing in
the text of the Final Report which would contradict the conclusion
of the Task Force's legal contractor that "[m]odification of the
collateral source rule is a feasible remedy."'" The Task Force did
suggest that strict product liability law was an area in which
"selective abolition" of the rule "might well be justified. 9 2
E. Restricting Punitive Damages
All but a handful of American jurisdictions permit a jury to award
"punitive" as well as compensatory damages when the defendant
has engaged in intentional or reckless disregard of the rights of the
plaintiff. 3 The Task Force restricted its analysis to problems that
punitive damages may create in product liability cases. It found
several. First, punitive damages could work an unreasonable hard-
ship on a corporation faced with a multiplicity of lawsuits stemming
from a single actionable wrong. Second, where a corporation is the
defendant, the ultimate brunt of a punitive award may well fall
either on the corporation's stockholders or on the public. 4
At one point the Task Force concluded, without amplification,
that the use of punitive damages has an "important potential deter-
rent effect."95 This conclusion seems to be undercut, however, by a
finding of the legal contractor that there have been relatively few
cases with punitive damage awards. 6 Perhaps the key word here is
"potential" deterrent effect.
In any event, the Task Force made at least one suggestion for
11 Id. at VII-72.
9 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.27 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3418 (1975); 40 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 1301.602 (1976).
11 See V PRODUCT LIABIUTY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 142.
2 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-75.
11 See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258
(1976).
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-76-77.
,1 Id. at VII-249.
U See V PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 119.
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changing the tort law in the case in which a single actionable wrong
by a corporation results in a multiplicity of lawsuits, with the possi-
bility of multiple punitive damage awards. In such a case the Task
Force reqommended that a judge, and not the jury, set the amount
of punitive damages, taking into account what already had been
paid.97
F. Periodic Payments
Under long-established practice, the trier of fact in a product
liability case must make a lump sum award of damages at the time
of trial." If the effects of the injury are more than temporary, how-
ever, the plaintiff may suffer loss of earnings or medical and other
expenses in the future which a one shot lump sum calculation is not
likely to reflect very accurately.
In view of serious problems claimed to result from the speculative
nature of the lump sum method of product liability verdicts, the
Task Force considered a proposal to set up a damage award system
where payments would be made in periodic installments. It con-
cluded that to set up such a system within the context of the exist-
ing tort litigation system would present "difficult technical and
policy determinations."99
The key question for which the Task Force was unable to find a
satisfactory answer was "whether the economic efficiency wrought
by a periodic payment system would be cancelled out by the admin-
istrative costs connected with that approach."' 00 In view of this diffi-
culty, and others, in making a periodic payment system work within
the context of the present tort system, the Task Force thought it
best that the system be considered in connection with such broad-
scale reforms as no-fault and arbitration systems.'0 '
V. MODIFYING PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES RELATING TO WORKPLACE
INJURIES
A. Introduction
A significant percentage of product liability litigation involves
persons injured in workplace accidents. As reported in the ISO Final
,7 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-80.
See generally, D. DoBBs, REMEDIES § 8.1 (1973).
" FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-81.
"0 Id. at VII-82.
"' Id. at VII-84.
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Survey, while claims by injured employees represented 11% of prod-
uct liability incidents, these claims accounted for 42% of the total
amount of insurance payments for bodily injury.'
In some instances, workplace injuries have resulted from the ac-
tions of someone other than the product manufacturer, for example,
an employer. Nevertheless, even where an employer is partly re-
sponsible, the manufacturer may be held liable to an injured em-
ployee for all damages suffered. This result stems from the concurr-
ence of several statutory and judicial doctrines. Under the current
law in most states, the injured worker has two recovery options, both
of which can be exercised simultaneously: first, recovery of workers'
compensation from the employer or its insurer, and second, recovery
from the manufacturer in a (successful) tort suit. However, as part
of the worker compensation "bargain," the injured employee may
not sue a negligent employer.'"3
Moreover, the manufacturer sued by the injured employee is not.
permitted in most states to recoup those litigation costs from the
negligent employer. 04 However, even where the employer was negli-
102 ISO SURVEY (HIGHLIGHTS), supra note 42, at 5. The Interagency Task Force's industry
contractor compiled data from a number of federal and state accident and injury reporting
systems. With respect to workplace injuries caused by products selected for study by the Task
Force, e.g., industrial machinery and chemicals, grinding wheels, metal castings. FINAL RE-
PoRr, supra note 1, at 1-6. The report indicated that these workplace products accounted for
the following percentages of accidents in various states: California 14.3%, Wisconsin 9.9%,
Washington 9.5%, Maryland 9.4%, and Texas 3.7%. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
LIABILrrY, I PRODUCT LIABILTY: INDUSTRY STUDY (1977), at 111-7.
In the legal contractor's survey of 655 reported product liability appellate cases in eight
representative states, roughly half of the products cases were classified as involving "work-
related" injuries (defined somewhat more broadly than "workplace"). III PRODUCT LABILITY
LEGAL STUDY, supra, note 23 at 79.
103 See generally, VI PRODUCT LtJBILrrY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 2-6.
10, E.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pipe Co., 275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.
Fla. 1967) (applying Florida law); Georgia Power Co. v. Diamond, 130 Ga. App. 265, 202
S.E.2d 704 (1973). For an extensive listing of cases following the majority rule, see VI PRODUCT
LIAILrry: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 7 n.3.
Other jurisdictions permit a third party held liable for an employee's injuries to recover
contribution from a negligent employer-to the extent of the worker's compensation liability.
Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953); PA. STAT.
ANN., title 77, § 671 (Supp. 1976); Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 238, 28 Cal. Rptr.
548 (1963).
California courts refuse to apply this rule, however, in a product liability situation where
the third party was a manufacturer held strictly liable. Ruiz v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 15 Cal. App.3d 462, 93 Cal.Rptr. 270 (1971).
See also, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972) (apportion-
ment of damages resulting from employee injuries between third party product manufactur-
ers and employers in spite of workers' compensation statutes, now codified in N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1976)); Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974)
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gent, the compensation carrier may be able to join the employee's
suit in a subrogation action against the manufacturer to recover
amounts paid out under workers' compensation.' 5
The Task Force finding' °" that manufacturers of workplace machi-
nery were among the hardest hit by the rise in product liability
insurance premiums is, therefore, not surprising. Most of the pro-
posals to solve product liability problems arising from workplace
claims were initiated by such manufacturers and have as their aim
the shifting of costs from manufacturers to employers. The Task
Force discusses four remedial devicbs: modifying the rules on contri-
bution and indemnity, prohibiting or modifying subrogation rights
in workers' compensation claims, validating hold-harmless clauses,
and making workers' compensation an exclusive remedy for work-
place injuries.
B. Modifying Contribution and Indemnity Rules
The common law rule of "no contribution among joint tortfea-
sors" has been changed in many jurisdictions. 7 Even where the law
permits contribution among joint tortfeasors, however, the great
majority of jurisdictions have held that the negligent employer can-
not be sued or joined as a joint tortfeasor. Technically, under the
worker compensation no-fault bargain with the employee, the em-
ployer is not liable to the employee in tort and, therefore, never a
joint tortfeasor.'0
Against this legal backdrop, capital goods manufacturers peti-
tioned the Task Force to consider proposals to permit them to sue
employers for contribution where the latter's negligence contributed
to a product-related injury. The Task Force called proposals to
allow manufacturers a contribution claim against negligent employ-
ers "one of the most important remedial proposals to reduce product
liability premium costs on the part of manufacturers of industrial
(declaring unconstitutional a state statute barring contribution or indemnity actions in the
absence of a written statement prior to the injury by a third party against an employer).
"' See VI PRODUCT LIABILTY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 3-4; Schweizer v. Elox Division
of Colt Industries, 133 N.J. Super. 297, 336 A.2d 73 (1975).
"' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 111-18-44.
,a The rule has been changed judicially in nine states, see Comment, Another Look at
Strict Liability: The Effect of Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 79 DICKINSON L. REv.
125 (1974). Statutes have changed it in at least 17 jurisdictions. The 1939 version of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act has been adopted in 10 states; the 1955 version
in 7.
" 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 76.21 (1976).
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equipment."'' 9 Beyond that promising beginning, however, it is dif-
ficult to determine which one of several alternatives the Task Force
considered most appropriate.
For example, on the issue of whether a manufacturer ought to be
allowed full contribution from the negligent employer based on their
comparative responsibility for a workplace accident, the Task Force
simply marshalled the pros and cons. An increased incentive for risk
prevention by the employer is balanced against increased legal and
transaction costs in accommodating the manufacturer's third-party
claim against the employer. The Task Force did conclude, however,
that a compromise remedy allowing manufacturers limited contri-
bution claims up to the amount of the employers' worker compensa-
tion payment had strong equities in its favor."" Reading between the
lines, the Task Force apparently remained ambivalent about chang-
ing the current rules on contribution in the absence of hard data
that the proposed remedy would actually improve the safety con-
sciousness of employers.
C. Prohibiting Subrogation by Workers' Compensation Carriers
Subrogation is the right of a party who has paid the losses of an
injured person to sue or otherwise be reimbursed by a third party
who was considered responsible under tort law for the injury. In a
typical case in most states, an employer who has paid out workers'
compensation benefits to an injured employee is subrogated to the
employee's rights against the product manufacturer."'
The specific mechanics of subrogation vary among the states."2
The principal arguments for abolishing subrogation in workers'
compensation cases are: (1) negligent employers should not be able
to recoup their workers' compensation payments when they are to
some degree responsible for the accident and (2) subrogation may
encourage litigation."'
The Task Force found no compelling reason to abolish the right
of subrogation entirely. It endorsed with uncharacteristic forthright-
ness, however, the approach used in a minority of states. That ap-
,01 FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at VII-95.
110 Id. at VII-92.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061(3) (1972): "If the employee or his dependents elect
to receive compensation from the employer, such employer is subrogated to the right of the
employee or his dependents to recover damages against the other party .. "
",2 See VI PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 48-49 and accompanying
footnotes.
"I Id. at 49.
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proach results in a reduction of a subrogation claim by the amount
of fault attributable to the employer in causing injury to the em-
ployee. The Task Force pointed out that, in order for this remedy
to affect insurance costs, it should be accompanied by a modifica-
tion of the collateral source rule in cases where the worker is joined
in the subrogation suit. Otherwise, the employee would stand to
recover twice." 4
D. Validating Hold Harmless Clauses
The Task Force noted an "apparent growing use of hold harmless
agreements.""' 5 Such agreements in the product liability context are
designed to assign ultimate responsibility for injuries or damage
caused by defective products. Courts have not agreed as to whether
commercial purchasers could contract to assume the risk of liability.
Some reveal strong antipathy toward clauses which purport to hold
manufacturers harmless from strict liability."' The argument has
been made, however, that since the doctrine of strict product liabil-
ity was intended primarily to protect consumers, and if their inter-
ests are not affected, there is no reason to prevent commercial pur-
chasers from contracting to allocate the risk of loss among them-
selves." 7 The Task Force was not as willing to make this con-
sumer/commercial purchaser distinction, suggesting that the goal of
placing the responsibility for accidents on the party best able to
prevent it would be thwarted by merely shifting the entire responsi-
bility for an accident from one party to another."8
Concerned that hold harmless clauses could be abused, the Task
Force nevertheless concluded that "it might be appropriate" to vali-
date such clauses legislatively in certain instances. The suggested
instances would be those situations in which the product purchaser
requested the product without safety features, failed to warn em-
"' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-99.
Id. at VII-100.
"' Compare Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McConnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974)
(applying California and Georgia law) and Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania law) with Sterner Aero AB v. Page
Airmotive, Inc., 449 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974).
"I See VI PRODUCT LIAsIUTy: LEGAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 41. This argument seems to
be the thrust of a recent decision, S.S. Empresa De Viaco Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines) v. The Boeing Co., [1977] PROD. LIAR. RvTr. (CCH) 8028 (commercial airline's
claims against manufacturer for loss of $6 million aircraft barred by an exculpatory clause in
purchase contract by which the manufacturer effectively disclaimed both negligence claims
and strict liability claims).
"I FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-102.
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ployees of specific dangers in using it, altered the product, or failed
to properly maintain it."'
E. Workers' Compensation As An Exclusive Remedy
Manufacturers of capital goods and others hardest hit by rising
product liability insurance premiums have advanced as a potential
remedy a proposal to abolish the right of an injured worker to bring
a tort claim against the product manufacturer. The worker would
be left solely to recovery under the workers' compensation system. 20
Although aware that this remedy would have little value to manu-
facturers of consumer goods, the Task Force's insurance contractor
considered this remedy a "high priority" item. 2 ' The legal contrac-
tor was less impressed. Its review of the case law found it unlikely
that such a sole source approach would survive constitutional attack
unless workers got a quid pro quo in return for surrendering their
right to sue the manufacturer. 2 2
After concluding that the sole source remedy probably would re-
duce "overall" insurance transaction costs, despite creating new
transaction costs, the Task Force stated the two conditions neces-
sary to implement such a remedy: increased benefits and contribu-
tion to the workers' compensation system by the manufacturer. 2 3
The latter condition is not easily implemented, as the Task Force's
discussion of various approaches demonstrated. In its own conclu-
sion, the Task Force considered the best procedure for manufacturer
payments into the worker compensation system to be a post-
accident arbitration proceeding.'12
Overall, the Task Force concluded that "cost effectiveness" and
the "potential impact" of making workers' compensation the exclu-
sive remedy for workplace injuries made the scheme "an attractive
one for serious legislative consideration.""' That conclusion, inci-
dentally, is at least as straightforward as any "recommendation"
made in the entire Final Report.
I' ld.
" NAW PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 46, at 20-21.
"' INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILrrY, PRODUCT LIABIuTY: INSURANCE STUDY 4-
80 (1977).
M2 See VI PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 75-77.
-z' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-108.
121 Id. at VII-112.
125 Id.
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VI. ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SCHEMES: NO-FAULT AND
ARBITRATION
A. Introduction
In any discussion of product liability tort litigation reforms, one
obvious, if drastic, remedy is to scrap the system. The thrust of the
Task Force's Final Report is not in that direction, but rather in the
direction of making adjustments to the present tort litigation sys-
tem. Nevertheless, stating that "[u]nless the tort-litigation system
can be stabilized, pressures toward developing a no-fault compensa-
tion system"'2 e will increase, the Task Force analyzed the pros and
cons of a no-fault alternative for compensating consumer product
injuries. The Task Force also examined another major alternative
- the use of arbitration procedures to replace the jury system as the
primary method of resolving product liability disputes. In both in-
stances the Task Force recognized the need for conducting addi-
tional research.
B. No-Fault Compensation Schemes
Few would dispute that under the existing fault or strict liability
systems of compensating persons injured by products, inefficiencies
exist which harm both plaintiffs and defendants. The investigation
needed and technical proof required in products litigation is expen-
sive for all parties. Both sides are exposed to the vagaries involved
in establishing both the fact and amount of liability. Long delays
inherent in the current tort recovery system work to the detriment
of uncompensated and suffering plaintiffs. Furthermore, rules
which permit recovery of pain and suffering damages and which
prohibit deductions to recognize recovery from collateral sources
operate to expand the liability of defendants)27
Is the solution for consumer product injuries a no-fault compensa-
tion system? The Task Force provided no clear or complete answer.
It described no-fault approaches for consumer-related product inju-
ries as "perhaps the most frustrating" of any remedies studied.2 '
The Task Force found strong reasons to recommend such systems.
Among those reasons were that a true no-fault product liability
126 Id. at VII-228.
17 See generally, J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No FAULT INSURANCE FOR PROD-
UCTS AND SERVICES (1975). For a criticism of Professor O'Connell's elective no-fault approach,
see VI PRODUCT LIABIUTY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 112-18.
2I FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-228.
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compensation system would increase the likelihood that particular
injured persons receive compensation. Another alleged benefit cited
was cost savings through reduction of tort system transaction
costs.',9
The Task Force also found major problems. One was that no-fault
systems achieve part of their cost effectiveness by not paying for
such traditional damages as pain and suffering. Another major
problem was the difficulty of determining product liability insur-
ance coverage. 3 ° Although conceding that pressure to develop a no-
fault system will continue, the Task Force stated categorically that
"no-fault does not represent an immediate solution to the product
liability problem.' 3' It recommended, however, that in view of its
less than exhaustive analysis of no-fault schemes, an additional
study be made to determine if a practical working model could be
made.
C. Arbitration
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution accomplished by a
group of individuals with professional experience in the particular
subject matter at issue. It is not a "no-fault" procedure since a panel
in a products case would still be governed by standard product
liability rules on liability and damages. 32 At the same time, an
arbitration procedure represents a substantial departure from the
typical tort litigation method of compensating victims of product
injury, in several respects. For one, it would replace the jury as the
trier of fact. For another, the arbitration system employs a fact-
finding process geared to more informal evidentiary rules.
The Task Force analyzed three arbitration formats: voluntary
binding, compulsory binding, and compulsory non-binding. After
analyzing the first format, the Task Force suggested that voluntary
binding arbitration probably worked better in the medical malprac-
tice context than in product liability cases. 3 As for compulsory
binding arbitration, the Task Force concurred in the view of its legal
contractor that compulsory arbitration without a trial de novo
would violate the constitutional guarantees of jury trial and due
process. 131
' Id. at VII-212, 214.
'' Id. at VII-218, 220.
' ' Id. at VII-228.
132 Id. at VII-229.
'3 Id. at VII-231.
'14 See VI PRODUCT LIABIuTY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 155, citing Application of
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Compulsory non-binding arbitration is "the most appropriate"
for product liability cases, the Task Force concluded, despite pos-
sible constitutional weaknesses.13 Reviewing recent cases, the Task
Force agreed with its legal contractor that such an arbitration pro-
ceeding would probably survive attack under state constitution
right-to-jury provisions if certain conditions were met. 3 These con-
ditions would include: (1) allowing a trial review procedure which
would admit evidence of the prior arbitration proceeding and (2)
showing that there was a product liability problem and that a com-
pulsory arbitration procedure was a reasonable way to resolve it.
The Task Force analyzed what it viewed as the principal benefits
flowing from the use of arbitration in product liability cases, includ-
ing a more accurate determination of product liability cases, reduc-
tion of accident reparation costs, and a streamlining of the repara-
tions process. Although concluding that a "properly constructed"
arbitration system had "excellent potential" for realizing these ben-
efits, the Task Force admitted it could not prove conclusively that
these results would follow. 137 Nevertheless, the Task Force's gener-
ally favorable endorsement of compulsory non-binding arbitration
coupled with the favorable endorsement of both its legal and insur-
ance contractors, 13 give that arbitration alternative a considerable
boost for the future.
VII. SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
Overall the Task Force analyzed some eighteen tort reform pro-
posals, ranging in scope from those which merely tinker with the
existing system to those, such as no-fault, which would scrap the
tort system entirely. "Our goal," said the Task Force, "was to
provide an analysis of remedies that could be readily used by
legislatures or others who are giving immediate consideration of
product liability reform.' 1 39 Opinions will differ on how "readily"
usable the Task Force's analysis is for legislative purposes. Cer-
tainly the Final Report demonstrates a sophisticated grasp of most
of the implications of the remedial proposals discussed. However,
Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625, appeal dismissed sub nom., Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858
(1955).
131 FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-238.
"' See VI PRODUCT LIABILIrY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 155-56.
'3, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-23.
" See VI PRODUCT LIABIUTY: LEGAL STUDY, note 23 supra, at 147-49; PRODUCT LIABILITY:
INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 121, at 4-86.
"I' FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-2.
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in its concern to be "fair to all of the groups who have an interest
in the product liability problem,"' 40 the Task Force had to dilute its
message to legislators with such singularly ambiguous terminology
as, for example, in the case of modifications to the collateral source
rule, urging that "very careful consideration" be given to any con-
templated change. On the other hand, the Task Force made one
of its most straightforward recommendations with respect to an
industry custom state-of-the-art defense, calling it "inadvisable"
to adopt such a defense.'
If, as Undersecretary Harman emphasized upon the release of the
Final Report, 2 the Task Force had no clear mandate to come for-
ward with a legislative program, then criticism about fuzzy lan-
guage and lack of specific legislative guidance in the Final Report
is misplaced. In any event, the Task Force implicitly arrived at the
important, if not surprising, conclusion that for every product liabil-
ity tort reform "solution" there is a problem. This conclusion takes
on added significance, considering the pressure for tort litigation
reform that, if anything, has increased since the product liability
problem leaped to national prominence in 1976.
Aside from quibbling over "fudged" recommendations, there are
several points in the Task Force's analysis of the ills in the existing
tort system which should not be overlooked. For one, the Task Force
concluded in almost every instance of a suggested tort reform that
there was no assurance that a change would have any immediate
impact on the price or availability of insurance. Even in the context
of suggestions to adopt statutes of repose to relieve manufacturers
of their age-old product liability concerns, some insurance sources
indicated that such a change would not be sufficient justification for
changing a company's underwriting posture.' The Task Force did
not analyze the question of whether or not a different result would
obtain if a complete "package" of tort reforms were to be enacted
simultaneously. Perhaps no hard answer to that question exists.
Practical reality may well dictate that insurers adopt a wait-and-
see attitude to determine the effect of a tort reform package on jury
verdicts before considering any rate changes. Nevertheless, the
point bears emphasis that merely correcting perceived inequities in
the existing tort system will not of itself solve the insurance availa-
4, Id. at VII-3.
Id. at VII-245.
11 See note 10 supra.
,, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VII-21, VII-49.
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bility or affordability problem, at least not in the short-term. Fur-
thermore, there are few assurances about the long-term benefits. If
this is the case, those who place their hopes for a product liability
solution in tort litigation reform should be forewarned to keep their
expectations within bounds or face inevitable disappointment.
The above admonition prompts a further inquiry into a basic
assumption of the Task Force in analyzing the existing tort system
as it did. "There seems little doubt," the Task Force asserted, "that
the current product liability problem was caused in part by the
tremendous uncertainty on the part of insurers about the nature of
the basic standards of responsibility in product liability cases.""'
This assertion prompts a question. If insurers find the existing prod-
uct liability tort law rules as unsettling as claimed, would it be
unreasonable to expect that they would respond enthusiastically to
remedial efforts that would decrease uncertainty, not to mention
their insured's potential liability?"' Why then a cautious wait-and-
see attitude? Perish the thought that after all of the Task Force
analysis of uncertainty in the existing tort system, it may be that it
is less what insurers do not know about the tort system than what
they do not like (high awards) that troubles them in setting insur-
ance rates for product manufacturers.'
On another point, product consumers should note the candid
admission of the Task Force that it "observed that most of the
substantive law proposals . . . we received called for cutting back
on the rights of consumers to recover under the tort-litigation sys-
tem.""'4 The Task Force continued that "[e]ven if some of the tort
modifications were justifiable, the social implications of leaving a
victim of a product-related accident without compensation might
meet with serious resistance from consumer groups.' 4 8 At the same
time, the Task Force felt compelled to question the extension of
strict liability to design defect or failure to warn cases unless fore-
seeability of harm was balanced against product utility and the
"' Id. at VII-15.
"' In fairness, the American Insurance Association has published a report entitled PRODUCT
LIABILITy LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE: STATUTES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF PRODUCT LaBILITY LAW (Revised Mar. 1977).
"I University of Toronto Professor of Law, S. M. Waddams, suggests that "the current
product liability problem in the U.S. reflects difficulties not with the legal basis of liability
(strict liability vs. negligence), but with high damage awards and what those have done to
the system." 1 PRODUCT LIABILITY TRENDS 28 (1977).
"I FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at VH-203.
iA Id.
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manufacturer's ability to avoid the risk.'49 This posture is even more
significant in the face of the recent continued expansion of the strict
liability concept, as in California, for example. 150
Raising these less obvious points about the Interagency Task
Force's Final Report should not detract from the overall importance
of its analysis of tort litigation remedies. Full agreement on such a
controversial topic will probably remain a pipe dream, but that the
Final Report is "basically fair" to the product liability interests of
injured parties, manufacturers, insurers, and others is supportable.
As a "blue print" for legislative tort reform, however, it leaves some-
thing to be desired in terms of precise and practical recommenda-
tions for changing a system that has been in existence many years.
" Id. at VII-20.
Im Shepard v. Porter, 76 Cal. App.3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977) (recovery of damages
for mental shock and resulting physical harm suffered by family members witnessing inflic-
tion of death on one of their own based on strict liability).
